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The Impact of OSHA and EPA Regulation on Productivity
ABSTRACT
This paper presents estimates of the impact of OSHA and EPA regulationon
productivity. Production information for 1450 manufacturing industries from 1958
to 1980is merged with measures of regulation, including both informationon
compliance expenditures by industry and enforcement efforts by OSHA and EPA.
Industriesthat faced higher regulation during the l970s had significantly
ipwer productivity growth, and a greater productivity slowdown, than industries
that faced lower regulation. Under certain assumptions, the regulation is
estimated to have reduced average industry productivity growth by .57' percent
per year, 39 percent of the average productivity slowdown. These results are
robust to variations in the itdel and the inclusion of other productivity
determinants, including poor output growth and dependence on ener,r. The
results also suggest a one—time cost of adjustment to regulation, so the
long—run impact nay be less than that estimated here.
Both OSHA and EPA are found to target their enforcement effort towards
those industries that are doing poorly in meeting the goals of the regulation.
However, in the only area where benefits from regulation can be examined, worker
injury rates and OSHA safety inspections, no significant benefits are found.
Wayne B. Gray




The slowdown inproductivity growth inthe U.S. econorrr during the l9TOs
hasbeen a matter of great concern to policymakers, associatedas it is with
inflation,unemployment, and declining real wage growth. Manypossible
explanationsfor the slowdown have been proposed, and much research has been
done to determine the contribution of these factors to the slowdown. The
research presented here examines the impact on productivity growth ofgovernment
regulation, specifically environmental and worker health and safety regulation
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (051-IA) and the
Environmental Protection Mency (EPA). Looking at data for 1450manufacturing
industries between 1958 and 1980, the study finds a large, negativerelationship
between this regulation and productivity growth. Under certainassumptions, a
large part of the decline in productivity growth during the l9lOsmay be
attributed to such regulation. However, the study also finds some evidence that
this decline could be a temporary one, representing a one—time cost ofadjusting
to the regulation rather than a recurring cost to society.
The major innovation of the study lies in the creation of a data set that
has information on output and inputs for many industries, allowing the
calculation of their productivity growth rates, along with data concerning the
extent of regulation of each industry. The regulatory data are taken from
surveysof the cost of compliance with regulation and from regulatory agency
records of the enforcement efforts directed toward different industries. The
basic result is that high levels of regulation are associated with low and
falling rates of productivity growth. This result is not fundamentally changed2
when measures of other factors that have been suggested ascauses of the
productivity slowdown are added to the model.
An attempt is made to measure the benefits fromregulation, with very
limited success due to problems with the available data. It isclearly shown
that the regulatory agencies focus their effortsupon industries which are
performing poorly in the areas of concern: worker safety and health, and
environmental pollution. However, other results suggest that in the onearea
where there is a useable measure of benefits, worker safety, it is difficult to
attribute significant benefits to regulation.
2. PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT ANDRDGULATION
2.1. Definition and Measurement
Productivity is the ratio of output produced to inputs used. Because
output and inputs are measured in different units, it is the growth of
productivity over time, rather than its level, that is of greatest concern. The
simplest measure of productivity is the single—factor measure, where only one
input is measured. In this case, productivity growth is given by the difference
between the growth rates of output and that input. The st commonly used
productivity statistics, measuring labor productivity, are of this form. These
statistics are easy to calculate, but ignore changes in other factors of
production, such as capital or naterials, which could affect output growth.
Other productivity statistics, called total factor productivity (TFP)
measures consider the contribution of all factors to output growth.3
Consider a production function for a firm,
I =TF(Xi,...,Xn)
whereoutput, Y, is a function of the productivity level, P,andn inputs X1.




whereaisthe cost share, and dx1 the growth rate, of input i. Then
productivity growth t=d log T is given kt
(i) = dy —Eadxi. i
Thiscalculation of the growth rate of productivity using the cost shares of
inputs and output and input growth rates is called growth accounting.
2.2.Effect of Regulation
A simple nndel ofthe impact of regulation on productivity would assert
that the production function remains unchanged, but the firm is required to use
some additional inputs, R, to comply with the regulation.If productivity
growth is calculated for the firm without knowing how much of each input was
used to produce output and how itch to produce compliance, inputs and
productivity would be measured as
X' Xi+Ri and I'dy
—Zaj'dxi'
Supposethat the fraction of each input used in compliance is given by
—0./v.. vi
—nil3-where 6 is near zero. True productivitygrowth t is then approximately
(2) = ÷
1
Therefore, one would expect an ordinary productivitygrowth nasure, which
ignores the existence of compliance inputs, tounderstate true productivity
growth by an amount equal to the sum of the cost shareof each input times the
fraction of that input used for compliance.
Regulation nay affect the firm's production beyondsimply requiring the use
of some inputs for compliance activities.
Regulation commonly imposes
constraints on the firm's choice of productionprocesses. These constraints
could force firms to change existing
procedures, reducing productivity during
the period of adjustment. Additionally, thepresence of regulation and the
possibility of future changes in regulation, increases theuncertainty faced by
firms, which could reduce investment in new rthods ofproduction and inhibit
productivity growth.
A simple test for the presence of an impact ofregulation on productivity
beyond the neasurement impact is available. Suppose thatproductivity growth
before regulation is imposed is t0. Alsosuppose that the fraction of each
input used for compliance sñth regulation is 6j.Ifactual productivity growth




Nowconsider taking observations on compliance costs andproductivity
growth for ny different industries, indexed by j.Restating Equation 3:5
(14) drj =a0+Ii(ajjoij)+
Herewe recognize that actual productivity growth islikely to change over time
for various reasons, and use a0, theaverage productivity change for all
industries, and Cj, an industry—specific component, to accountfor this change.
If we believe that there is no relationship betweenregulation, as measured
by compliance costs, and changes in actual productivitygrowth, we would expect
the regression indicated in Equation 14toyield y =—1.If there is some
impact of regulation on actual productivity, we wouldexpect Ii * —1 and
probably li< —1,since ntst of the impacts of regulation would beexpected to
reduce actual productivity.
When measures of compliance costs are notavailable, but other measures
(say M±j) of different levels of regulationapplied to different industries are




There is no longer a ay to separate the impact ofregulation into measurement
and actual effects, but it is possible to examine themagnitude of the impact of
regulation on changes in measured productivity growth.
Wecould attempt to nDdel directly the impact of regulationon the demands
for and marginal products of different inputs,using a rre detailed nrdel of
the production process, with impacts on productivitybeing derived as a result.
As the n3del becomes nore involved, it becomes ucre sensitive topossible
misspecificationor errors in the variables. Since compliance costs tend to be
poorly measured, and are often not measured at all, this cancauseproblems for
the nore complex nodels. This study tends to avoid the xmDrecomplicated
analysis in order to get some basic results from simpler techniques.6
2.3Growth of Regulation
There was a substantial increase in governmentregulation of business
during the early l9TOs. Both the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration
(OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)were created in 1970. The
pattern followed by both agencies is similar: before theearly l9TOs, the
primary responsibility for regulation lay with the states. The statesvaried
enormously both in regulatory standards set and in the enforcement effortthey
used to ensure compliance. Public dissatisfaction with thepoor performance of
the state—level regulation led to pressure for federalaction, and federal
agencies were empowered to tighten the standards and especially to increase the
enforcement effort. In the case of 05kM, this meantsetting standards on a
national level, and using a large force of federal compliance officersto
enforce compliance.1
For EPA, the states still bore the responsibility fordeveloping and
administering State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to achieve reductions in
pollution, but the law set strict timetables for the SIP development andgave
EPA the power to force the states to prepare a plan. Therewere some national
inspectors, to help check on the effectiveness of the states' effort, but notas
many as at 05kM. On the water pollution side, the EPA was required to establish
a permit system for all effluent discharges, designed to met certain water
quality standards. Compliance with both types of regulation was to be enforced
through the courts.
Both EPA and 05kM are required by law not to consider compliance costs when
deciding what standards to propose. The standards proposed often specify theI
control techniques to be used, and tend to require capital—intensive compliance
methods. The standards have also changed over time, in response to new
information on health risks, political pressures from various groups, and court
decisions.
There is some doubt about the power of the agencies to enforce compliance
with the standards, because rare inspections are combined with low fines for
violations to yield very low expected penalties for non—compliance. Table 2.1
presents data on the manufacturing inspections carried out by OSHA and EPA
during the time period of the study. Because OSHA concentrates on manufacturing
to a great extent, the inspection rates are not completely negligible, with
about 10 percent of all manufacturing workplaces inspected each year. Also, the
inspections are not randomly allocated, so some establishments can have quite a
high probability of being inspected in a given year.
Table 2.1 also provides some information on penalties assessed and an
estimate of expenditures on compliance by the firms. The penalties are quite
low relative to the compliance expenditures, suggesting that nost compliance
expenditures are nntivated by other reasons. The historical neasure of
pollution abatement capital, also presented in Table 2.1, showed that pollution
abatement capital has grown nuch nnre rapidly than other capital, especially
from the late l960s through the middle 1910s. We do not have such time series
data for worker health and safety investment. It seems likely that such





Inspections Worker Health and Safety
Capital Expenditures
Number Percent of Amount ($M) Percent of Estab1jshnts Investment
1973 30112 9.141 2.87 868.1 3.22 1974 37828 11.55 3.23 12614.9 3.56 1975 40397 12.06 14.93 1203.4 3.22 1976 34945 10.20 6.6o 1010.5 2.149 1977 32925 9.141 9.16 1407.1 2.95 1978 29428 8.24 13.87 1692.6 3.06 1979 28600 7.84 114.36 1621.0 2.63 1980 26962 7.211 12.80 2081.3 2.95
EPA
Inspections Pollution Abatement Pollution Abatement
Capital Expenditures Operating Costs
Number Percent of Amount($M) Percent of Amount($M) Percentof
Establishments Investment Total Cost
1973 73 0.02 2351.8 8.71 24142.14 0.28 1974 1484 0.15 3098.5 8.72 3101.0 0.30 1975 2516 0.75 3634.7 9.73 3662.2 0.35 1976 14887 1.43 3529.1 8.70 14538.6 0.38 1977 7288 2.08 3480.3 7.29 54214.5 0.140 1978 9012 2.52 3262.5 5.91 6260.5 0.41 1979 10389 2.85 3558.9 5.78 7399.8 0.143 1980 111478 3.08 3502.8 4.97 81142.2 0.414
Pollution Abatement Capital Stock (Real)
Other Capital Stock
Level($B) Growth Rate Growth Rate
1960 3.36
1967 5.39 1960—1967 9.9 2.9 1970 11.146 1967—1970 16.3 14.8 1975 24.25 1970—1975 16.1 3.3 1981 36.114 1975—1981 8.3 3.14
Pollution abatement capital stock data fromKappler and Rutledge (1982).
Sources of other data listed in Section 4.9
3.PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN —EVIDENCEAND (PLANATIONS
3.1.Evidence for Slowdown
The most widely observed measure of productivity is the labor productivity
index produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This measures productivityas
the real output produced per worker—hour of all workers. It is calculated for
several sectors of the econonv, including the private business, nonfarm
business, and inufacturing sectors. Average growth rates for these sectors
during several periods are given in Table 3.1.
During the early postwar period, all three sectors showed impressive growth
rates: between 1950 and 1969 output per worker hour rose about 2.5 percentper
year. The most rapid growth came during the long expansion of the 1960s. Some
slowdown in the non—manufacturing sector is seen by the period between 1969 and
1913, and nufacturing follows suit in the 1913—1980 period. During the 1910s
all three sectors showed very low rates of labor productivity growth by postwar
standards, dropping to less than half their 1950—1969 levels.
Table 3.1




Private Business 2.8L 2.93 2.61 0.61
NonfarmBusiness 2.32 2.51 2.45 0.48
Manufacturing 2.149 3.02 3.98 1.28
Source; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983).10
As mentioned in Section
2, this study concentrates onmeasures of total
factor productivity ratherthan labor productivity. Becausethe input index is
more complicated for total factor
productivity measures, a wide variety oftotal
factor Productivitymeasures exists, each using differentprocedures to
calculate total factor input.This leads to a nixchgreater dispersion in
estimates of productivitygrowth, with no single, generallyaccepted measure.
The results from severalsuch studies are presented in Table3.2.
These studies indicate thattotal factor productivitygrowth fell
substantially during the l9TOs, relativeto the rest of the postwarperiod. The
studies cited here suggest thatthe decline in productivitygrowth began in the
early l97Os (around 1913),although others have found the declinebeginning in
the late 1960s. Thereseems little doubt from these data thatthere was a
slowdown in productivity
growth, however measured, during thel9TOs (although
Darby (1982) argues that the slowdown
is an illusion, caused by theimposition
and later lifting of pricecontrols in the early l970s).
3.2. Possible Explanations for theSlowdown
What factor or factors could havecaused such a decline inproductivity?
As indicated earlier, this
paper focuses primarily on the impact ofincreasing
government regulation on productivity,looking at OSHA and EPA regulation.
However, almost every change in theeconon that coincided with this decline in
productivity has been proposed as anexplanatory factor.2 Factorssuggested
frecjuenti.y include a rise inenerr prices, a long and severerecession, a11
Table 3.2
Multifactor Productivity Growth Rates
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decline in capital investment by business,a fall in research and development
activities, and a decline in the quality of inputs (especiallylabor).
Denison (1979) uses econonw_wide data and calculationsbased on the
growth accounting framework to measure the contribution ofdifferent factors to
the slowdown. His is the most completeattempt to measure the contributions of
various factors. He discusses all of them,provides estimates for some
(including government regulation) and concludes thatmany were involved in the
slowdown. He ascribes some of the slowdown in total
factor productivity growth
of 2.17 percent to resource allocation (.30), thelegal and human environment
(.30), economies of scale (.13) and other minor factors.However, he is left
with an unexplained fall in residualproductivity growth of 1.68 percent after
accounting for those factors he could measure.
Studies which calculate the contribution ofregulation to the slowdown
basedon compliance cost estimates tend to produce small estimates.Denison
(1979) estimates that such regulation contributed.35 percent to the
productivity slowdown in the 1972—1975 period, andina later study (1983)
concludesthat the contribution fell to .15 percent in the 1973—1981period.
Portney (1981) notes that little of GNP is spent on pollutioncontrol (under 2
percent).
Estimates using cross—indust or time—series data havegenerally given
slightly larger, but similar results. Norsworthy, Harper and Kunze (1979)find
that pollution abatement capital had a limited effecton labor productivity.
Scherer (1982) finds that pollution and health andsafety investment reduced
productivity growth by .19 to .27 percent, but this effect is notsignificant.13
Using time series data and measures of total
federal regulation, Christajnsen
and I-tavexnan (1981) find regulationresponsible for about 20 percent of the
slowdown. Crandall (1981) finds astrong relationship between pollution
abatement capital and productivity, but thisrelationship disappears when a
measure of enerr intensity is included.Using time—series data, Siegel (1979)
observes a significant contribution (.5percent) from pollution control
expenditures to the productivity slowdown for1965—1973, but not for later
years. Finally, Gollop and Roberts (1983) examine data fora set of electric
utilities and find that regulation of emissionshad a large impact on total
factor productivity, lowering it forregulated firms by .59 percent. The
conclusion of these studies (except
perhaps for Gollop and Roberts) is that
pollution abatement costs in particular, andregulation in general, explain
about 10 percent of the productivity slowdown.
We can reach four general conclusions fromprevious work. First, there was
a productivity slowdown during the l970s, atleast in measured productivity.
Second, manydifferentfactors seem to have contributed toit, to different
degrees. Third, government regulation contributeda small but significant
amount to the slowdown. Fourth, a sizeablefraction of the slowdown remains
unexplained by the estimated contributions of all thefactors considered. We




The data set used in thisanalysis Consists of data for 450manufacturing
industries at the 4—digit level, basedon the 1972 Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC). Annual data from1958 to 1980 on real and nominaloutput
and inputs are used in the calculation
of industry productivitygrowth. Data
are also available on the extent of
government regulation of these industries
for the ire recent years of theperiod (as we saw in Section 2, therewas
relatively little regulation before theearly l970s). Additional data include
measures of industry performance on pollutionabatement and protect ion of worker
safety and health. The major data sources
are listed in Table 4.l. We now turn
to a brief description of eachtype of data and the way in which theyare
combined. A more extensive description of
the data is provided in Gray (19814).
14.2. Productivity Data
The principal source of the data neededto calculate productivity growth
was a joint project by the University ofPennsylvania, the Bureau of the Census,
and SRI, Inc. This project assembled
basic input and output data from 1958to
1976 on all 1450 industries. It isreferred to here as the PCS data set.3Much
of this data, including inputs,outputs, and factor shares, wastakenfrom the
Annual Surveys of Manufactures andCensuses of Manufactures. Themajor
contribution of the project was thedevelopment of rasures of the real capital





U Penn —Census—SRI 1958—1976Output, inputs, prices
Census of Manufactures 1977 Output, inputs
Annual Survey of Manufactures 1978—1980Output, inputs
Census Bureau —BLS 1958—1980Price Deflators
Regulation Sources
McGraw—Hill Safety Investment 1973—1980Investment in worker Survey health and safety
Census —PollutionAbatement 1913—1980Pollution control capital Costs Survey
and operating costs
051-LA NanagernentInformation System 1972—1980OSHA inspections,
citations
EPACompliance Data System 1970—1980EPA enforcement actions
Other Data Sources
NIOSH Injury Survey 1958—1970Injury rates
BIAS Occupational Injuries and 1972—1979Injury rates Illness Survey
OSHA Industry Priority Report 1981 Health hazard rankings
EPA National Emissions Data System1970—1980Emissionlevels, control
equipmentefficienciespurchased by each industry. The PCSdata was then updated through1980, using
data from the 1977Censusof Manufactures and the 1978through 1980Annual
Surveys of Manufactures, Price deflators
for output (value ofshipments),
material inputs, and enerrusage were obtained using data from theBureau of
Labor Statistics and the CensusBureau.
14,3, Regulation Measures —ComplianceCosts
There is very limited dataon costs to firms of complying withOSHA
regulation. The data we consider hereare taken from an annual McGraw—Hill
survey on capital spending for the 1913 to 1980period. Each year McGraw—I-{in
collects information from a few hundredlarge firms on current.year capital
expenditures and projected expenditures forthe next year, and for twoyears
later. One question asks whatfraction of total capitalspending is allocated
to worker safety and health.Problems with this data include the
nonrepresentative nature of the firmssampled, the low response rate
(especially on the safety and health
question), and the small size of the total
sample. These data are examined briefly inSection 5,butthey prove
unsatisfactory.
The data for EPA—relatedcompliance costs were also taken froma survey,
but this survey was far superior tothat used for OSHA—related costs.These
data are from the Pollution Abatement
Costs and Expenditures Survey, taken
annually by the Bureau of the Census since
1913. The survey is sent to about
20,000 establishments a subsample ofthose in the Annual Survey ofManufactures
excluding establishmsnts in majorgroup 23.4 The survey asksrespondents to22
fell from 2.9 percentper year in 1953—1969 to 0.9 percentper year in
1913—1980, similar to the drop in labor
Productivity growth, as measured by the
BLS, from 3.0 percent to 1.3percent across these periods. Totalfactor
productivity growth rates also fell
during this period, as they did in the
studies previousa.y cited. Forcloser comparison with theaggregate numbers from
other sources, growth ratesweighted by industry size (value ofshipments for
total factor productivity andworker hours for laborproductivity) are also
included in the table andare presented in Chart 5.1. Theslowdown is similar
in 'gnitude and timing tothat described in Section 3.The highly cyclical
nature of productivity fluctuationsis apparent from Chart 5.1.We turn now to
an examination of the determinantsof this slowdown.
Table 5.1
Average Industry Productivity GrowthRates
Period: 1958-801958-691969-731973-781973-80
Industry Average
LaborProductivity 2.37 2.88 3.62 1.148 0.81 Total Factor Productivity o.1414 0.96 0.95 —0.514 —0.67
Weighted Industry Averagel
Labor Productivity 2.44 3.03 3.60 1.50 0.86 Total Factor Productivity0.49 1.15 1.06 —0.52
1. Labor productivity
averages are weighted by total employee hours. Total factor productivity































































































































































































1 TFPC}IG Change in annual TFP growthrate: 1959—69to1973—78 2TFP7378 Annual TIP growth rate 1913—78
3 LPCHG Change in asnual 12 growth rate: 1959—69to 1973—78 4121378 Azinual 12 growth rate 1913—78
5OSHINS OSHA employee inspection rate 1974—78
6 OSHEST OSHA establishment inspection rate1974—78 7EPAINS EPA establislijuent inspection rate 1974—78 8PACE Pollution abatement capitalexpenditures
asshare of real capital stock, 1974—78
9PAOC Pollution abatement operating costs
as share of naterials cost, 1974—78
10 SAFINV Employeesafety and health investment
asshare of real capital stock, 1974—78
Index Name Mean (s.d)
1 TFPCI-IG —.0l46(.032) 2 TFP7378 —.0o54(.o29)







Number of observations 45o
Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10
1.0 .86 .76 .66—.i4—.12—.12—.11—.18 .14 2 .86 1.0 .67 .76—.16—.16—.17—.15—.21 .12 3 .76 .67 1.0 .85—.22—.23—.18—.18—.16 .14 4 .66 .76 .85 1.0—.20—.20—.11—.13—.10 .14 5—.14—.16—.22—.20 1.0 .11 .37 .45 .27—.13 6-.12—.16—.23—.20 .71 1.0 .57 .65 .42—.11
7'-.12—.17-.18-.11 .37 .57 1.0 .64.62.03 8-.11-.15-.18-.13.45 .65 .641.0 .64 .10 9 —.18—.21—.16—.10.27 .42.62.64 1.0 .01 10.i4 .12 .14 .14—.13—.11 .03 .10 .011.021
Table 5.3
Initial Regression Results
(Basic Data Set, N450)
(standard errors in rentheses)
Dep.Var. Mean ModelConst. OSHINSEPAINSPAOC R2(SSE)
TFPC}{G —.03)46 Al —.0110 —.0068 — .020
(.0019) (.002)
A2 —.0132 — —.033 — .014
(.ooi6) (.013)
A3 —.0109 — — —.659 .032
(.0018) (.i) (.44°) AS —.0108 —.0055—.021 — .025
(.0019) (.002) (.014) (.442) AS —.0089 —.0048 — - .556 .ohi
(.0020) (.002) (.18)(.4)
TFP7378 —.0055 Bi —.0015 —.0012 — — .027
(.0018) (.002) (.4) B2 —.0035 — —.043 — .028
(.0015) (.012)
B3 —.0015 — —.701 .042
(.ooi6) (.i6) (.368) B4 —.0012 —.0052—.031 — .040
(.0017) (.002) (.013) (.369) B5 .0007 —.0051 — —.591 .055
(.ooi8) (.002) (.16) (.363)
Fraction of Total Drop InProductivity Growth
Attributed to Regulatory Variables
Model All—Beg OSHINS EPAINS PAOC
Al .25 .25 —
A2 .10 — .10
A3 .25 — .25
.26 .20 .06
A5 .39 .18 .21
For each of the TFPCHG equations theconstant term nEasures the
estimated change in productivitygrowth if regulation had been
zero. The nean of the dependent variableis the actual change in
productivity growth. The difference betweenthese two numbers is
the estimated contribution ofregulation to productivity growth
(negative in all cases). This isexpressed above as a fraction of
the actual productivity dec1ine.31
Table 6.i
Outlier and Non—Linearity Analysis
Regressions on Subsets Excluding Outliers
(standard errors in parentheses)
Subset:Exclude High OSHINS, PAOC1 Also Exclude Low PAOC2
Mean TFPCHG TFP7375 Mean TFPCHGTFP7375
OSHINS .1475 —.0094 —.0085 .550 —.0091 —.0083
(.45) (.0014) (.003) (.48) (.oo4) (.003)
FAOC .0050 —.5826 —.6578 .0064 —.5345 —.61443 (.oo) (.228) (.208) (.008) (.234) (.209)
constant —.0069 .0023 —.ooy6 .0022
(.0023) (.0021) (.0028) (.0025)
mean dep var —.0143 —.0050 —.0160 —.0065
(.032) (.029) (.031) (.028)
R2
.045 .o4 .o5y .o66 (SSE) (.1428) (.351) (.284) (.226)
438 438 304 3014
1. Excludes 7 industries with OSHINS >3.0and 5 with PAOC>.014
2. Excludes 134 additional industries with1974—78 average pollution
abatement operating costs c $1M
Basic Model: Non—linearity Test
(standard errors in parentheses)
Dep Var Constant OSHINSPAOCOSH*PAOC OSH*OSHPAOC*FAOC 2(SSE)
TFPCHG—.0044—.0150—.980 .092 .0026 10.03 .051t (.oo) (.522) (.211) (.ooi4) (11.3) (.429)
TFP7378 .0032—.0098—.950 .oi4 .0013 9.314 .060
(.005) (.479) (.194) (.0013) (10.4) (.361)33
Table 6.2
Non—ParametricAnalysis
Mean TFP by Regulation Quartiles
Name Quartile Mean TFPCHG TFPI3T8
OSHINS 1 .122 —.0012 .0009 2 .256 —.0087 .0002 3 .46i —.0204 —.0104
14 1.325 —.0223 —.0125
EPAIIcS1 .0003 —.0085 .0004 2 .0032 —.0126 —.0016 3 .0123 —.0150 —.0064 4 .1613 —.0225 —.01141
PAOC 1 .0008 —.0075 —.0003 2 .0021 —.0126 —.0021 3 .0038 —.0130 —.0074 4 .0158 —.0205 —.0120
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients
(P—valuesin parentheses)
TFPCHG TFP7373 OSHINS EPAINS PAOC
TFPCHG1.0 .81(.ooi)—.19(.OOl)—.13(.006)—.17(.oo1) TFP7373.8i(.ooi)1.0 -.19(.OOl)-.18(.ooi)-.18(.ool) OSHINS —.19(.OOl)—.l9(.0Q1)1.0 .46(.ooi) .36(.OOi) EPAINS—.13(.0o6)—.18(.ooi).46(.ool)1.0 .61(.ool) PAOC —.17(.ool)—.18(.OOl) .36(.OOi).61(.ooi)1.035
Table 6.3
Enerr Intensity and Capital Intensity
(Basic data set, N =4o) (standarderrors in parentheses)
Dep Var Const. 0SHINS PAOC ENSH1 CAPSH2R2(BSE)
A]. TFPCHG —.0112 —.212 .021
(.0019) (.07) (.14414) A2 TFPI3I8 —.0016 —.233 .030 (.ooi) (.06) (.312)
Bi TFPCHG —.0085 —.00149 —.439 —.066 .042
(.0021) (.0023) (.214) (.09) (.'c35) B2 TFP7378 .0012 —.0051 —.1441 —.085 .057 (.0019) (.0021) (.22) (.09) (.362)
Cl TFPCHG .0011 —.o6o .022
(.0052) (.02) (.141414) C2 TFP7378 .0031 —.032 .001
(.0048) (.02) (.381)
Dl TFPCHG .0055 —.0051 —.552 —.055 .059
(.0054) (.0023) (.i8) (.02) (.527) D2 TFPT3T8 .00714 —.0055 —.5143 —.026 .059
(.0049) (.0021) (.11) (.02) (.361)
El TFPCHG .0056 —.0051 —.380 —.ohi —.055 .059
(.0054) (.0023) (.24) (.09) (.02) (.427) E2 TFP7378 .0075 —.0055 —.1415 —.0114 —.0214 .06i
(.ooS9) (.0021) (.22) (.09) (.02) (.361)
Fraction of TFP Drop Attributed to Regulation
Model All—RegOSHINS PAOC Controlling For
ENSH CAPSH
B .35 .18 .11 x D .38 .21 .17 K E .36 .21 .15 X x
1. Enerr cost share (in total cost),l969._73,mean= .oi6, s.d. .022
2. Capital cost share (in total cost),1969—73, mean= .263, s.d.= .01831
Table6.14
Cyclical and Declining Industry Controls
(Basic data set, N=450)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Cons. OSHINS PAOC GLPCHG1TFPCHGX2 R2 (ssE)
TFPCHG —.0068 —.0049 —.510 .094 .066 (.0021) (.0023) (.177) (.021) (.4214)
TFP7378 .0018 —.0051 —.599 .052 .o64 (.0019) (.0021) (.163) (.025) (.360)
TF'PCHG—.0088 —.0050 —.547 —.024 .043 (.0020) (.0023) (.179) (.028) (.45)
TFP7378 .0003 —.oo414 —.635 .118 .098 (.002) (.0021) (.160) (.025) (.346)
TFPCHG —.oo6 —.0050 —.563 .093 —.018 .067
(.0021) (.0023)(.i) (.028) (.028) (.4214)
TFP7378 .0016 —.oo414 —.645 .060 .122 .110
(.0019) (.0021) (.159) (.025) (.025) (.342)
1. Change in growth rate of productionworkers between
1959—69 period and 1973—78 period.
2. Change in TFP growth rate between1959—63 period
and 1963—69 period.Table 7.1
Targettingof Enforcement Effort
DepVar: SAFEYPY HEALTH EPAINS EPAINS6
Mean(s.d)
Const. —.238 —.074 —.010 .081
(.076) (.028)(.012)(.017)
UNION1 .1458(.146) .978 .265 .023 .118
(.165) (.o6o) (.021) (.035)
ESTSIZE2 .099(.163) .526 .400 .123 .0143









Depvar mean .405 .149 .044 .146
(s.d) (.sii) (.178)(.n4) (.094)
.166 .282 .513 .060
SSE 97.84 7.00 2.82 2.82
N 1450 309 450 339
1. UNION is the fraction of production workers unionized, 1973—75.
2. EBTSIZE is the mean number of production workers per
establishment, 1974—78.
3. INJ7478 is the mean lost workday injury rate, 1914—78.
4.HAZINDEX isthe OSHA health hazard index (based on 19714 survey).
5.E11ITAVG is the mean annual particulate emissions for establishments
withemissions data (only available for 339 industries).
6.HereEPAINSisthe mean inspection rateforestablishments on the
ComplianceData System (i.e., inspections/CDS establishments, not
inspections/total establishments).'4,4
Table7.2
Benefits from OSHA Safety Inspections
Dependent variable: changes in injury rates
(standard errors in parentheses)
(1) (2) () ('4) (s)
TimePeriod 59—69:73—TB 59—69:79 72:19 12:79 72:79
Const. —.036 .0104 .279 .212 .186
(0.42) (.072) (.051) (.053) (.o4)
PRSHIP1 —.001 .130 .047 .026 .033
(.083) (.077) (.075) (.073) (.075)
PRODEMP2 .103 .108 .195 .210 .217
(.058) (.052) (.070) (.068) (.069)
PRCAP3 .035 —.029 —.0001 .043 .061
(.072) (.o6'4) (.075) (.074) (.076)




INJRAT Controls5 X X
Depvar nean .075 .259 .363 .363 .363 (s.d) (.418) (.442) (.296) (.296) (.296)
B2 .092 .124 .080 .152 .139
SSE 71.3 76.8 36.2 33.3 34.2
1. Percentage change in real value of shipments per production worker.
2. Percentagechange in number of production workers.
3.Percentagechange in real capital stock perproductionworker.
4.PredictedSAFETYfromregression, Table 8.1.
5.Regressions include 1976, 1977, and 1978 injury rates as controls.55
ii.Appendix Table A—i presents a list of the top 10 industries for each
of the major regulation variables, and some measures of the distributionof
each variable.
12. The fractions used here are the fractions of allcompliance
expenditures accounted for by manufacturing, based on data from the
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality report (1980) whichpresents
estimates of total compliance costs, and the manufacturing cost data.
13. From U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980) which indicates that
manufacturing was responsible for about b4 percent of all workplace
injuries and 25 percent of fatalities.
lb. One could argue that these abatement expendituresare a
beneficial result of the EPA inspections, not a determinant of them.
However, differences in changes in these expenditures over time are
negatively (not positively) related to differences in the EPA
inspection rates.